State of Utah v. James Lee Little : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1966
State of Utah v. James Lee Little : Brief of
Respondent
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Phil L. Hansen and Gary A. Frank; Attorneys for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Little, No. 10654 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3869
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES LEE LITTLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPOND 
JAMES LEE LITTLE 
Prose 
Box 250 
Draper, Ut.ah 
Attorney for Appellant. 
Attomeys fer ae.P111• 
State Ca.pitol. . 
Salt Lake City, Ut!!llh, (" 
.-. .... -f.·' 
•. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE. ....... 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT________________________ 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ........................................ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS____________________________________________________ 2 
ARGUMENT ... ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 
POINT 1. APPELLANT'S RE Q U E ST FOR 
MENTAL HEARING TRANSCRIPTS 
CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. __________________ 3 
POINT II. IT WAS PERMISSIBLE FOR THE 
INFORMATION TO CHARGE THE 
APPELLANT WITH THE CRIMES 
OF ROBBERY AND GRAND LARC-
ENY ARISING OUT OF THE SAME 
FA CT S AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
AND SINCE THE APPELLANT WAS 
SENTENCED TO SERVE CONCUR-
RENT SENTENCES ON THE CON 
VICTIONS FOR ROBBERY AND 
GRAND LARCENY, THE APPEL-
LANT HAS NOT BEEN PREJUD-
ICED. -------------------------------------------------------- 5 
POINT III. APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM DE-
NIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
ON APPEAL WHERE APPELLANT 
REQUESTED COUNSEL WITH-
DRA W. ------------------------------------------------------ 7 
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
Cases Cited 
Danks v. State, 418 P.2d 488 (Utah 1966) ------------------------ 9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
State v. Donavan, 77 Utah 343, 294 Pac. 1108 (1931) ____ 6,7 
State v. Hammond, 64 Wash. 2d 591, 392 P.2d 1010 (1964) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887 (1957) ____ 7, 8, 9 
State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 1966) -------------------- 7 
State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174 (1961) ____ 4 
State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965) ____ 4, 5 
State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 
( 1965) --------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- ·i 
Statute Cited 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-31 (Supp. 1965) ---------------------------- 6 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JAMES LEE LITTLE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
10654 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT< 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was convicted of the crimes of 
robbery and grand larceny upon jury trial in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of 
Utah, and was committed to the Utah State Prison. 
This appeal is from the denial of a motion for a new 
trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The appellant was charged in one information 
with having committed the crime of robbery and 
with having committed the crime of grand larceny 
(R. 1). Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion for tran-
scripts of sanity hearings of appellant. (R. 21). This 
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motion was never called up for a hearing, never 
heard, and no mention made of these transcripts until 
this appeal was filed. Appellant made a further mo-
tion that the information as filed violated the 
jeopardy statute (R. 296). The trial court rejected the 
contention and the jury returned a verdict of guilty 
on both counts. The appellant was thereafter sen-
tenced to be committed to the Utah State Prison. 
The sentences on count 1 and count 2 of the in-
formation were imposed to run concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 11 :00 a.m. on March 20, 1965, 
the appellant entered the office of Dr. Robert H. 
Burgoyne at 310 Medical Arts Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah in attempt to obtain narcotics (R. 111). This 
attempt failing appellant thereupon pulled a Ger-
man Luger pistol from underneath his coat, robbed 
Dr. Burgoyne of money in excess of $50.00 and a 
wristwatch, then fled (R. 111, 115, 116). 
At approximately twenty minutes after eleven 
o'clock of that same day, Captain Dewey Fillis, Salt 
Lake City Police Department saw a man answering 
the description of the armed robber of Dr. Burgoyne 
riding in a taxicab (R. 141 ). Capt. Fillis radioed in 
the location and Officer James McDuff, Salt Lake 
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City Police Department seeing appellant getting out 
of the same numbered taxicab, requested appellant 
to answer several questions (R. 133). Capt. Fillis came 
onto the scene and advised appellant of his right 
to remain silent (R. 142). 
Appellant was wearing a watch (R. 142) later 
identified as having been taken from Dr. Burgoyne. 
Dr. Burgoyne's wallet was found in appellant's front 
pocket (R. 144) and a German Luger pistol was 
taken from appellant's belt (R. 145). At trial appellant 
admitted taking Dr. Burgoyne's wristwatch and wal-
let in the manner described above (R. 196). 
On or about April 19, 1965, appellant entered 
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to the 
charges listed in the information (R. 5). On April 24, 
1965 appellant was examined by two court ap-
pointed psychiatrists (R. 8). On April 27, 1965 ap-
pellant was committed to the Utah State Hospital 
until such time as he would be able to stand trial 
(R. 13). 
On August 20, 1965 appellant was remitted from 
the custody of the Utah State Hospital being de-
clared fully sane and capable of cooperating in his 
own defense (R. 15). Based on the above evidence, 
the jury returned a conviction of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR MENTAL HEAR-
ING TRANSCRIPTS CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
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The appellant's first assignment of error is the 
trial court's alleged failure to allow him a transcript 
of the mental hearing held April 27, 1965. Appellant 
requested the transcript in a motion filed December 
6, 1965. (R.21). This was two days prior to trial. The 
record indicates that this motion was never heard, 
nor was the request ever renewed by the appellant. 
The rule is clear that questions not raised in the 
tril court will not be considered on appeal. State v. 
Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965). 
The appellant cannot now pray for relief where 
there is no indication that he requested the tran-
script prior to the state's presentation of its case, or 
prior to his presentation of a defense, or at any other 
time prior to a request for the transcript as a part of 
the record on appeal. (R. 79). This question was 
never presented to the trial court before or during 
trial. As was stated by the Washington Supreme 
Court in a case considering an alleged denial of due 
process in State v. Hammond, 64 Wash. 2d 591, 593, 
392 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1964): 
We have said several times that we will not consider 
questions not propertly submitted to the trial court, 
for that court must be given a chance to view and 
correct the claimed error before the matter can be 
reviewed by this court. 
This Court in cases questioning the admission 
of evidence has held that objection to such admis-
sion must be made at the trial court. State v. San-
chez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174 (1961). State v. 
Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965). Here we 
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have the reverse situation. Appellant did not request 
a ruling on his motion at any time. What may have 
been his reasons for so doing we can only surmize. 
This Court in allowing matters to be heard for the 
first time on appeal does so only under special cir-
cumstances as was stated in State v. Smith, 16 Utah 
2d 374, 375-76, 401 P.2d 445, 446 (1965): 
The purpose of this is to call attention to rulings 
claimsd to be erroneous at a time when they may be 
corrected; and also to guard against any deliberate 
withholding of objections with an ulterior purpose 
in mind of later taking advantage of errors com-
mitted. 
Since the transcript of the proceeding at trial 
court is absolutely void of material concerning a 
hearing of appellant's motion, or of setting the mo-
tion for hearing, and that this alleged denial was 
never brought before the court in any manner save 
the original filing with the court, the respondent 
submits that this allegation cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
POINT II 
IT WAS PERMISSIBLE FOR THE INFORMATION 
TO CHARGE THE APPELLANT WITH THE CRIMES 
OF ROBBERY AND GRAND LARCENY ARISING OUT 
OF THE SAME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, AND 
SINCE THE APPELLANT WAS SENTENCED TO 
SERVE CONCURRENT SENTENCES ON THE CON-
VICTIONS FOR ROBBERY AND GRAND LARCENY, 
THE APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED. 
The appellant contends that the jury verdict of 
guilty on the charges of robbery and grand larceny 
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and the judgment and sentence on robbery and 
grand larceny was double jeopardy. It should be 
noted that the Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-31 (Supp. 
1965) provides that an information and indictment 
must charge but one offense and further provides 
that an information or indictment for robbery "may 
contain a count for larceny." Consequently, the in-
formation in the instant case (R. 1) is properly drawn 
because the two charges arose out of the same act. 
It is admitted that in State v. Donavan, 77 Utah 343, 
294 Pac. ll08 (1931), the court ruled that the crime 
of robbery includes the crime of grand larceny. 
However, the court noted that it was not necessary 
that larceny be charged but did not state that it was 
improper to do so, 77 Utah at 345, 294 Pac. at 1108-09: 
While it is permissible in an information for 
robbery to include a separate count for larcency, it 
is not necessary to so plead larceny, because larceny 
is necessarily included in robbery, and a case of 
robbery cannot be stated without also stating a case 
of larceny. Under statutes similar to section 9025 
[Now Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953)], the gen-
erally accepted modem rule is that an indictment 
for robbery will sustain a conviction for larceny. 
31 c. J. 868. 
Consequently, it would be improper to find a 
defendant guilty of robbery and larceny arising out 
of the same act and impose consecutive sentences. 
However, in the instant case, the commitment and 
the judgment acknowledge that appellant was con-
victed of robbery in count 1 and grand larceny in 
count 2 of the information and provides that the 
sentences shall run concurrently (R. 57, 306, 307). 
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Thus, the appellant is in no different position than 
if the crime of robbery alone had been charged. , 
The imposition of sentence complained of in 
the trial court will in no event result in prejudice 
such that a new trial must be granted. In State v. 
Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 1966) the defendant 
was also found guilty at trial court of robbery and 
grand larceny arising out of a single act. Defendant 
appealed saying the larceny charge should have 
been dismissed as being a lesser included offense 
to robbery. This Court agreed with defendant and 
citing State v. Donovan. 77 Utah 343, 294 Pac. 1108 
(1931) dismissed the lesser included charge of grand 
larceny and affirmed the robbery conviction. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM DENIAL OF RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL WHERE APPELLANT RE-
QUESTED COUNSEL WITHDRAW. 
The privilege of an accused to the assistance 
of counsel is one of the fundamental rights. It is 
more than empty form; it means the right to a reput-
able member of the bar who is willing, and in a 
position to honestly and conscientiously represent 
the interests of the defendant and to present such 
defenses are are available to him under the law and 
consistent with the ethics of the profession. State v. 
Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887 (1957). Appellant 
was represented by able counsel throughout the 
course of the trial. Counsel attempted to withdraw 
prior to trial at defendant's request, but the court 
ruled that counsel was ready for trial, that defendant 
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had had adequate time in which to secure other 
counsel, and that counsel was competent and there-
fore the motion to withdraw was denied. (R. 1). Ap-
pellant does not claim any denial of constitutional 
rights to counsel during the course of the trial, only 
that he was denied such rights when this Court 
failed to name another counsel to handle the appeal 
after appellant had asked Mr. Mitsunaga to with-
draw. 
Mr. Mitsunaga was appointed by the Court to ' 
represent appellant as is stated in appellant's brief. 
There is no showing that Mr. Mitsunaga was any-· 
thing but diligent in attempting to represent appel-
lant. Mr. Mitsunaga as the Salt Lake County Legal 
Defender has had a large case load presented him 
by the Court. In view of this the Court allows Mr. 
Mitsunaga time extensions to file appeals when the 
situation so warrants. In this case, a motion to extend 
time for filing of appellant's brief was granted to 
August 31, 1966. On September 28, 1966 appellant 
requested withdrawal of his court appointed coun-
sel. 
It is for this Court to decide the reasons appel-
lant chose to request withdrawal. This Court has 
granted the trial court discretion in appointing coun-
sel when a defendant has requested a change. In 
State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887 (1957), the 
trial court was allowed to consider the statement by 
defendant that he had "lost confidence" in his at-
torney where such was unsupported by any other 
fact. The court concluded that defendant's objec-
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tion was not born of any genuine concern about the 
abilities of counsel to properly represent him, but 
was for an ulterior purpose. In that instance, the trial 
court could properly refuse the request for other 
counsel. 
In Danks v. State. 418 P.2d 488 (Utah 1966), this 
Court stated that there is no obligation on the part of 
the court to continue to appoint counsel after the 
defendant in the case has discharged assigned 
counsel for no apparent reason. 
It is the respondent's contention that appellant 
should not be allowed to raise this point as a valid 
ground for appeal. As was stated in State v. Hines. 6 
Utah 2d 126, 132, 307 P.2d 887, 891 (1957): 
It is obvious that if an accused could arbitrarily 
refuse the counsel offered by the court simply be-
cause he did not approve, and insist that another 
be appointed, he could similarly refuse successive 
attorneys ad infinitum, which would permit him in 
effect to select his own attorney, and also to ob-
struct proceedings indefinitely. 
To allow appellant to manufacture grounds for 
appeal would be to open the flood gates and could 
well subject appeals courts to situations wherein 
defendants would specifically waive constitutional 
rights then use that waiver as a lever to reopen the 
entire case to review. This Court should not allow 
defendants to subvert the existing appellate pro-
cedures by being able to lift themselves into a re-
view situation by their own bootstraps. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant has admitted in open court an armed 
robbery and grand larceny. There were no requests 
during the trial proceedings for a hearing on the 
motion for transcripts of the sanity adjudications. 
Concurrent sentences for included offenses are not 
prejudicial. Appellant cannot be heard to object to 
his lack of counsel for appeal when he had summar-
ily dismissed court appointed counsel. Considering 
these facts, the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
